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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CIVIL RIGHTS--42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974) REQUIRES ALL-WHITE
PRIVATE SCHOOLS TO CONTRACT WITH BLACKS FOR ADMISSION.
Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc., 363 F. Supp. 1200
(E. D. Va. 1973).
Two black children, Colin Gonzales and Michael McCrary, were
denied admission to summer day camps in two all-white Virginia pri-
vate schools because of their race. Their parents brought consolidated
actions in Gonzales v. Fairfax-Brewster School, Inc.,' for a declaration
that the school policies violated a federal statute.2 Section 1981 grants
all persons the same rights as are enjoyed by white citizens to make
and enforce contracts and guarantees them equal 'benefit of all laws
which pertain to the security of persons and property. The plaintiffs
also sought compensatory damages and a permanent injunction pro-
hibiting the defendant schools from following their discriminatory pol-
icy. An association representing private, white schools intervened as
a defendant. The intervenor conceded that race was a factor in its pol-
icies of exclusiveness, but contended that section 1981 could not reach
discrimination in wholly private schools. In its opinion, the federal dis-
trict court held that section 1981 is to be read literally, and thus no
state action is necessary to invoke the statute. The court found that
private schools whose enrollment policy had no basis for exclusiveness
other than race were not truly "private" schools and therefore could
not discriminate on the basis of race without violating section 1981.
The court also ruled that the intervenor's testimony which asserted that
1. 363 F. Supp. 1200 (E.D. Va. 1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974): All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce con-
tracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of all persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions
of every kind, and to no other.
1
Evans: Civil Rights--42 U.S.C. 1981 (1974) Requires All-White Private Sc
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1974
1974] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
their schools had higher academic achievement and lower disciplinary
problems than integrated schools was irrelevant. Gonzales seems to
conform to the latest statement of the Supreme Court on section 19811
and will thus have a profound effect on states such as Oklahoma which
have held that state action is a prerequisite to invoking section 1981.1
Gonzales marks the first use of section 1981 to force private, all-
white schools to contract with blacks for admission into their schools.
However, in other attempts to use section 1981 as a bar to private dis-
criminatory practices, such as in employment contracts, the lower fed-
eral courts have not uniformly held that section 1981 reaches purely
private discrimination. The differences of opinion center on the ques-
tion of whether section 1981 was passed by Congress to enforce the
fourteenth amendment, which requires state action,' or the thirteenth
amendment, which does not require state action.0
Prior to 1968, a similar division existed in the federal courts over
interpretation of section 1982, the companion statute to section 1981,
which guarantees blacks the same property rights that white citizens
enjoy.7 The Supreme Court, in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.," held
3. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Rec. Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
4. Smith v. North American Rockwell Corp.-Tulsa Div., 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D.
Okla. 1970).
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, 5.
Section 1. . . . No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
6. U.S. CONsr. amend. XIM.
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as punish-
ment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropri-
ate legislation.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1974):
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold, and convey real and personal property.
8. 392 U.S. 409 (1968), noted in 15 How. LJ. 699 (1969). The commentator
discussed the significance of which amendment § 1982 was intended to enforce:
The arguments of the majority and dissenting opinions center around Congress'
authority to enact § 1982 and whether this authority was derived from the
Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment. This determination is crucial in that
(1) if § 1982 were enacted under Congress' power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment, the provisions of § 1982 are not limited to state action but would
also apply to individual private action or (2) if § 1982 were enacted under
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, the provisions of §
1982 are limited only to state action for that is all with which the Fourteenth
Amendment is concerned.
15 How. IJ. at 704.
2
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 10 [1974], Iss. 2, Art. 9
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol10/iss2/9
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
that section 1982 does not require state action to invoke it. In resolv-
ing the question the Court said:
We hold that § 1982 bars all racial discrimination, private as
well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and that the
statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power of
Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment.9
However, in Cook v. The Advertiser Company,' ° a federal district
court found an historical basis for giving different treatment to section
1981. The court held that section 1981 was a derivative of section
16 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870 which was enacted subsequent to
the adoption of the fourteenth amendment. Therefore section 1981
was presumed to enforce the fourteenth amendment. However, the
court also found that section 1982 was a derivative of section one of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act which was enacted subsequent to the adop-
tion of the thirteenth amendment but prior to the adoption of the four-
teenth amendment. Therefore section 1982 was held to enforce the
provisions of the thirteenth amendment. The court in Cook noted that
the Jones decision interpreted section 1982 to reach private discrimina-
tion but the Jones ruling did not extend to section 1981. Therefore
the Cook court found that section 1981 requires state action because
of its different historical basis. Nevertheless, other federal courts have
arrived at exactly the opposite conclusion and have held that section
1981 is the historical companion of section 1982 and that neither statute
requires state action before it can be invoked."1
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court settled at least the his-
torical basis of this controversy over the construction of sections 1981
and 1982 in Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Rec. Ass'n. 2  The court found
that the historical basis for both statutes was in the Civil Rights Act
9. 392 U.S. at 413.
10. 323 F. Supp. 1212 (M.D. Ala. 1971), noted in 33 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 121 (1971),
af'd on other grounds, 458 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972). On appeal, refusing to pub-
lish society announcements of blacks was held not to give rise to an enforceable right
of contract. Thus, there was no breach of § 1981, since no consideration was paid for
these announcements. 458 F.2d at 1122.
11. Scott v. Young, 421 F.2d 143 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970)
(the court held that ". . . § 1981, the sister to § 1982, must be construed in similar
broad fashion." Id. at 145); Brady v. Bristol-Meyers, Inc., 459 F.2d 621 (8th Cir.
1972) (§ 1981 was derived from the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and reaches private,
racial discrimination in employment); Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine Contracting
Company, 437 F.2d 1011 (5th Cir. 1971) (Both §§ 1981, 82 are derived from the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and must be construed consistently as reaching private en-
tities).
12. 410 U.S. 431 (1973).
[Vol. 10
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of 1866, and that the Civil Rights Act of 1870 was merely a reenact-
ment of part of the earlier 1866 act. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
stated in part:
That all persons born in the United States... of every race
and color. shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory in the United States, to make and enforce contracts
. . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens
. . . . (emphasis added)13
Thus the predecessor of section 1981 was enacted before the four-
teenth amendment was formally proposed, and though reenacted in
1870, it still had the continued purpose of enforcing the thirteenth
amendment.
However, the Court did not state in Tillman that these statutes
must be construed similarly in all cases.
In light of the historical interrelationship between § 1981 and
§ 1982, we see no reason to construe these sections differ-
ently when applied, on these facts, to the claim of Wheaton-
Haven that it is a private club (emphasis added).' 4
By confining the case to its facts, there may still be a question of
whether private schools should be treated differently -for section 1981
purposes than private clubs, but it seems reasonable to predict that the
Court, to be consistent, would continue to hold both section 1981 and
section 1982 as implementing the thirteenth amendment in areas other
than membership in private clubs.
The Gonzales decision relied heavily upon and closely paralleled
the two major holdings of the Supreme Court in Tillman. First, the
court held that section 1981 can reach private discrimination, and, sec-
ond, the court redefined a "private establishment". This second aspect
of Gonzales held that section 2000a(e) of Title 421r is not a limitation
on section 1981 and the exemption for private establishments did not
apply in -this case because the Supreme Court had previously abolished
13. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27.
14. 410 U.S. at 440.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1974) provides in part:
(a) All persons shall be entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of the
goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any
place of public accommodation, as defined in this section, without discrimma-
tion or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin.
(e) The provisions of this subchapter shall not apply to a private club
or other establishment not in fact open to the public, except to the extent
that the facilities of such establishment are made available to the customers or
patrons of an establishment within the scope of subsection (b) of this section.
1974]
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traditional notions of what is "private".1 6 Thus, since neither school's
admission policy evidenced any exclusiveness other than race in select-
ing students, these were not truly "private" schools. The district court's
ruling is in line with the Tillman decision in which the Supreme Court
unanimously held that a swimming pool which has no selective element
other than race is not a private club within the meaning of section 2000
a(e).
Traditionally, private schools have been able to discriminate on
the basis of race, in the absence of specific state statutes prohibiting
discrimination. 17  The relationship between pupil and school was
thought to be governed by contract rather than public rights. The state
of Oklahoma specifically forbids discrimination only in the public
schools, and therefore would conform to the traditional state position."'
The Oklahoma position on section 1981 was stated by the federal dis-
trict court for the northern district in Smith v. North American Rockwell
Corp-Tulsa Div.19  The court held that section 1981 extends only to
actions or omissions under color of state law. However, this position
has been reversed by the Supreme Court in the Tillman decision.
Thus, Gonzales should be applicable to any private school in Oklahoma
which has no selective criteria other than race. Indeed, through Gon-
zales, discrimination in private schools may now be under attack in all
states as violating the black citizen's right to contract as protected by
section 1981.
Larry E. Evans
16. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969). The Court said:
The Virginia trial court rested on its conclusion that Little Hunting Park was
a private social club. But we find nothing of the kind on this record. There
was no plan or purpose of exclusiveness. It is open to every white person
within the geographic area, there being no selective element other than race.
Id. at 236.
17. Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d 887, 338 P.2d 633
(App. Dep't 1959) (Private school could refuse to admit a five-year-old black girl be-
cause the state civil rights act did not include private schools as places of public accom-
modation); Kirkpatrick v. Williams, 53 N.M. 477, 211 P.2d 506 (1949) (Private beauty
school had total discretion in accepting students; only upon acceptance would any
right of contract arise); Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156-Mich. 95, 120
N.W. 589 (1909) (Medical school's refusal to admit Blacks did not deny them any
constitutional rights).
18. Oi A. STAT. tit. 70, § 1210.201 (1971), provides: "Segregation of children
in the public schools of the State of Oklahoma on account of race, creed, color or
national origin is prohibited."
19. 50 F.R.D. 515 (N.D. Okla. 1970); Judge Barrows held:
Absent any clear ruling by the Supreme Court to the contrary, the Court is
constrained to preserve the longstanding general construction of 42 U.S.C.
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